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I. INTRODUCTION
As demand for high-speed, or broadband, in-
ternet connections grows at an ever-increasing
rate, so too has competition grown between cable
companies and traditional telephone companies
for the opportunity to serve that demand. With
cable companies seeking to strengthen their pres-
ent position as the leading providers of residential
high-speed internet access,1 the issue of which
rules govern the marketplace behavior of those
cable companies becomes increasingly important.
The answer to the question of what rules apply to
the provision of internet access and other infor-
mation services over cable facilities has tremen-
dous implications not only for information service
* Earl Comstock and John Butler are partners in the
Washington, D.C., law firm of Sher & Blackwell. The firm
represents clients engaged in the competitive provision of
communications services, including competitive local
exchange carriers, internet service providers, resellers, and
internet backbone providers. Prior to joining Sher &
Blackwell, Mr. Comstock served as legislative director for
Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) and as a special
telecommunications counsel for the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation. While working for
Senator Stevens and the Commerce Committee Mr.
Comstock was a principal participant in the negotiation and
drafting of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Mr. Butler
has represented telecommunications clients before the
Federal Communications Commission and the courts for the
past seven years. The views presented here are solely those of
the authors.
I See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competi-
tion in the Markets for Delivery of Video Programming, Sixth
Annual Report, CB Dkt. No. 99-230, FCC 99-418, at paras. 58,
62 (releasedJan. 14, 2000) (noting that 32 million homes are
passed by cable modem access, with 1 million subscribers;
there are 159,000 xDSL subscribers) [hereinafter Sixth Cable
Report]. Internet access is not defined under the Communica-
tions Act of 1934. In general the term is used to refer to serv-
ices that permit the user to access information content and
other users through transmission services that utilize the in-
ternet protocol. See infra note 47.
2 As the Commission noted in its Amicus brief to the
providers ("ISPs"), cable companies and tele-
phone companies, but also for consumers of all
communications services.
The issue has been prominently debated under
the label of "open access" to cable facilities3 that
are used for internet access. The open access de-
bate has had its most recent practical applications
in the merger of AT&T and TCI, the pending
merger of AT&T and MediaOne and the just an-
nounced merger of AOL and Time Warner. 4
These merger proceedings before the Federal
Communications Commission (the "Commis-
sion"), and those before local cable franchise
boards around the country, will continue to focus
well-deserved attention on the question of
court in AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, there is no agreed
upon definition of "open access." See Amicus Curiae Brief of
the Federal Communications Commission at 8 n.2, AT&T
Corp. v. City of Portland, No. 99-35609 (9th Cir. Aug. 16,
1999), available at <www.techlawjournal.com/courts/port-
land/19990816fcc.htm> [hereinafter FCC Amicus BrieJ]. In
this article, the term "open access" is used to mean the same
"open" access to the underlying transmission conduit that
the Commission granted to all enhanced service providers in
the Computer H proceeding. That proceeding required all
common carrier facility operators to permit enhanced service
providers, including ISPs, to purchase the underlying con-
duit or "transmission service" on the same terms and condi-
tions on which the common carrier provides that transmis-
sion to itself or its affiliated ISP. See In re Amendment of
Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations,
Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 474-75, para. 231 (1980)
[hereinafter Computer II].
3 The term "cable facilities" is used in this article to refer
to the physical transmission infrastructure of a "cable system"
as defined in section 602(7) of the Communications Act of
1934. See 47 U.S.C. § 522(7) (1994 & Supp. II 1997). A
"cable system" is "a facility, consisting of a set of closed trans-
mission paths and associated signal generation, reception,
and control equipment that is designed to provide cable ser-
vice which includes video programming[.]" Id.
4 See, e.g., AOL Seen Unlikely to Remain Advocate of Open Ac-
cess Rules, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 12, 2000, at 1.
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whether cable companies that provide internet ac-
cess using their cable facilities must make the un-
derlying transmission capacity available on a non-
discriminatory basis to ISPs that are not affiliated
with the cable company. Under the governing
federal law, there are two related issues: the first is
whether the Communications Act of 19345 ("the
Communications Act" or "the Act") defines the
transmission of internet access and other informa-
tion services to the public over cable facilities as a
common carrier service that is regulated under
Title II of the Act; the second is whether those
services can be transmitted to consumers as a
cable service protected from common carrier reg-
ulation under Title VI of the Act.
Although the issue appears on its face to be
(and is in fact) one of straight statutory construc-
tion, the debate over open access has led the in-
dustry and the Commission away from the statute
and into a policy squabble that bears no relation
to the decisions made by Congress when it
amended the Communications Act in 1996.6
This article attempts to return the focus to the
words of the statute, as amended, which is the sole
authority for the regulatory actions of the Com-
mission and the ultimate arbiter of what cable
companies can and cannot do in the internet ac-
cess marketplace. Because this issue, like other
major issues arising out of the 1996 amendments,
will most likely be heard by a panel of federal
judges whose first concern will be the actual lan-
guage of the statute, the authors suggest that in-
5 Communications Act of 1934, Title I, ch. 652, 48 Stat.
1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-221).
6 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-710.).
7 See Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining the Future
in Terms of the Past, 7 CoMMLAw CONSPEcTUS 37, 98 (1998)
(noting that "the Commission could reasonably interpret the
1996 Act as permitting the creation of 'parallel universes' for
cable and telephony Internet-based services"). As this article
demonstrates, such a result would be in conflict with the stat-
utory language. See also THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT: A LECIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE MAJOR AMENDMENTS, 1934-1996, at
374-77 (Max D. Paglin ed., Pike & Fischer 1999) [hereinaf-
ter A LEGIsLATvIE HISTORY].
8 See 47 U.S.C. § 532(b) (restricting federal, state, and lo-
cal authority to require cable channels for use by program-
mers unaffiliated with the cable operator); 47 U.S.C.
§ 541 (c) (prohibiting common carrier regulation of cable
services).
9 The "internet" is a term that has many meanings de-
pending on who is using it. See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S
TELECOM DICTIONARY (14th ed. 1998) at 375-76 ("It is very
hard to define the Internet in a way that is meaningful or
easy to grasp ... [the Internet] is basically transparent to
terested observers and participants would be well
served now to return their focus to the Communi-
cations Act. A review of the statute as amended
indicates that the Commission is on the wrong
course, and that it must return to a path within
the authority of the Communications Act before
its present "parallel universe" policy 7 becomes so
embedded in the internet access marketplace that
it causes irreparable harm to competition, con-
sumers, thousands of independent ISPs and the
structure of the global internet itself.
That the Commission's approach will harm
consumers stems from the fact that the underly-
ing premise of cable regulation is that the facility
owner in general may control the content and
who may offer seri kEs that are transmitted over
its cable facilities." &ch control is the antithesis of
the present day internet."' In contrast, the underly-
ing premise of common carrier regulation is that
the facility owner must make those facilities avail-
able to all who wish to use them, and in general
may not control the content or services offered by
others over those facilities.10 What the authors ad-
vocate is that the Communications Act as
amended by Congress in 1996 requires the Com-
mission to apply to cable facilities used to transmit
internet access and other information services to
the public the same open access rules that require
all telecommunications facility owners to share
the underlying transmission "conduit" with unaf-
filiated ISPs and others who wish to offer their
content and services to consumers over those fa-
what it carries. It doesn't care if it carries electronic mail, re-
search material, shopping requests, video, images, voice
phone calls, requests for information, faxes, or anything that
can be digitized, placed in a packet of information, and
sent."). Part of the confusion in the present debate stems
from the fact that the term is used loosely to describe both
the underlying transmission facilities (the "conduit"), the
TCP/IP protocols used to transmit information over those
facilities, and the myriad of computer servers used to store
and transform information provided by both service provid-
ers and users. For purposes of this article the term "internet"
refers to the information content and services provided by
and to users over telecommunications facilities, and not to
the underlying conduit. The Commission treats all "internet"
services as "information services" under the Communications
Act. See infra section IIB.
10 See NEWTON, supra note 8, at 168 (definition of com-
mon carrier); In re Application for Consent of Transfer of
Control of Licenses of MediaOne Group, Inc., to AT&T
Corp., Written Ex Parte of Prof Mark A. Lemley and Prof. Law-
rence Lessig, CS Dkt. No. 99-251, at para. 20 (noting that "the
[common] carrier is not to exercise power to discriminate in
the carriage") [hereinafter Lemley-Lessig Ex Parte].
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cilities. Application of existing rules requiring
open access to the conduit to cable facility "con-
duit" used to transmit internet services is not new
"regulation" of the internet. Rather, it is simply a
continuation of the successful government policy
that resulted in the competitive market for in-
ternet services that exists today."
A. The Commission Believes it Can Take a
Discretionary Approach
The current debate over "open access" to cable
facilities used for the provision of internet access
and other information services flows largely from
a failure by the Commission t9 carry out its statu-
tory duty under the 1996 Act,02. A fundamental as-
sumption of the current Commission appears to
be that persons engaged in the transport of infor-
mation services to the public at large are only
common carriers if, and when, the Commission
affirmatively determines their status. 13 Thus, for
example, the Commission appears to believe that
it can simply refuse to determine the regulatory
status of internet access and other information
services provided over cable facilities, thereby pro-
tecting cable operators from basic open access re-
quirements that would otherwise apply to the
transport of information services. 14 Under this
discretionary approach, the Commission believes
that it can promote its policy goal of rapid broad-
band access by not regulating the underlying
transmission service used to provide information
services over cable facilities until there is a "mar-
ket failure" that requires some affirmative ac-
tion.' 5
B. The Courts and Congress Have Both
Determined That Actions, Not a
Commission Determination, Decide Who Is
Regulated
11 See Lemley-LessigEx Parte, supra note 10, at paras. 30-36.
12 Section 1 of the Communications Act states that the
Commission "shall execute and enforce the requirements of
this Act." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
i3 See FCC CABLE SERVICES BUREAU, BROADBAND TODAY:
INDUSTRY MONITORING SESSIONS 44 (staff report authored by
Deborah A. Lathen) (1999) [hereinafter BROADBAND To-
DAY]; see also FCC, OPP, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF
THE INTERNET 25 (authored by Jason Oxman) (1999); Esbin,
supra note 7, 118 (1998).
14 See FCC Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 9 ("the Commis-
sion saw no reason 'at this time' to require cable operators to
open their broadband systems to all ISPs").
The Commission's discretionary approach is
contrary to the plain language of the Communica-
tions Act. As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
noted in National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners v. FCC, "we reject an unfettered dis-
cretion in the Commission to confer or not con-
fer common carrier status on a given entity, de-
pending upon the regulatory goals it seeks to
achieve."'16 Further, the court stated that a "partic-
ular system is a common carrier by virtue of its
functions, rather than because it is declared to be
SO."17
None of the amendments made by Congress in
the more than 20 years since the NARUC I court
made its ruling has changed or undermined the
validity of that ruling. In fact, since 1993, Con-
gress has twice considered and rejected the discre-
tionary approach that the Commission has
adopted in its quest to be viewed as a non-regula-
tory body whose primary task is to promote broad-
band deployment. In both cases Congress opted
instead to follow the NARUC I approach, classify-
ing an entity for purposes of the Communications
Act based on the services it provides, rather than
the affirmative judgements of the Commission.
In the 1993 amendments to the Communica-
tions Act that added section 332(c) regarding
"commercial mobile services," Congress required
that all commercial mobile service providers, in-
cluding those formerly determined by the Com-
mission and the courts to be non-common carri-
ers, "shall" be treated as common carriers to the
extent of such service.' Further, Congress gave
the Commission explicit authority to deal with
market power issues, by providing statutory au-
thority to forbear from applying to wireless com-
mon carriers many otherwise applicable provi-
15 See FCC Chairman William E. Kennard, How to End the
Worldwide Wait, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1999, at A18; see also
FCC Chairman William E. Kennard, Consumer Choice Through
Competition, Remarks to the National Association of Telecom-
munications Officers and Advisors (Sept. 17, 1999); FCC Ami-
cus Brief supra note 2, at 18.
16 525 F.2d 630, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1976) [hereinafter
NARUC 1].
17 Id.
18 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
In NARUC I the court found that the proposed specialized
mobile radio service at issue, which was classified as a private
mobile radio service, was not a common carrier service. See
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sions of Title II of the Communications Act. 1
Congress repeated and expanded upon its 1993
approach in the 1996 Act amendments. A "tele-
communications carrier shall be treated as a com--
mon carrier under this Act only to the extent that
it is engaged in providing telecommunications
services.. ."21 No discretion is left to the Commis-
sion to determine whether or not telecommunica-
tions carriers are or are not common carriers. It is
the act of offering a service to the public for a fee,
in this case offering "telecommunications,"'' 2 that
determines a provider's regulatory status under
the statutory definition of "telecommunications
service."2 2 The statute does not delegate to the
Commission the authority to determine whether
the common carrier requirements of the Act ap-
ply based on a determination of market power,
market failure, or any other criteria the Commis-
sion may decide.23 Instead, Congress once again
chose to provide discretion to the Commission to
forbear from applying requirements of the Act
otherwise applicable to persons who by their ac-
NARUC 1, 525 F.2d at 644. In the 1993 amendments Congress
changed the classification of specialized mobile radio services
and several other private mobile radio services to commercial
mobile services subject to the common carrier requirement.
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
§ 6002(c) (2) (B) & (d)(3)(B), Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat.
312, 396-97 (1993) (amending the Communications Act of
1934, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332).
'9 See47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (1994 & Supp. Ill
1997).
20 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (1994 & Supp. I11 1997).
21 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997) (defining
"telecommunications" as "the transmission, between or
among points specified by the user, of information of the
user's choosing, without change in the form or content of
the information as sent and received").
22 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (1994 & Supp. Il 1997) (defining
telecommunications service as "the offering of telecommuni-
cations for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of
users as to be effectively available to the public, regardless of
the facilities used").
29 In the 1996 Act, Congress elected not to adopt the
Senate's "market power" approach, which would have au-
thorized the Commission to determine market power among
local exchange carriers and, thus, when the open access pro-
visions of the statute now codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251 would
apply. See S. CONF. REi,. No. 104-230, at 117 (1996). Congress
instead imposed interconnection requirements on all tele-
communications carriers regardless of their market power;
imposed certain additional requirements on all local ex-
change carriers, including new entrants without market
power; and compelled additional cost based unbundling and
collocation requirements on all incumbent local exchange
carriers, again, regardless of their market power. See id. at
121-22. Thus, in cornerstone provisions of the 1996 Act,
Congress has explicitly relected the "market-based harm"
tions are telecommunications carriers under the
criteria set forth in the statute.2 4 In the absence of
the Commission exercising that forbearance au-
thority in accordance with the Act (and it has
not), a provider that meets the statutory defini-
tion of a telecommunications carrier is subject to
common carrier regulation under title 11.25
C. The 1996 Act Was Intended to Create a
Level Playing Field, Where the Same Rules
Apply to the Same Services, Regardless of
the Facilities Used
Unfortunately for consumers and competitors,
the Commission's current approach undermines
the very regulatory parity and technological neu-
trality that Congress sought to adopt in the 1996
Act.2 6 Worse, it will likely result in a decrease in
the number of competitive choices for consumers
instead of the increase Congress intended. The
1996 Act eliminated state and local barriers to en-
try in the business of providing telecommunica-
predicate to regulatory action advanced by the FCC staff. See
BROADBAND TODAY, supra note 13, at 47.
24 As part of the 1996 Act amendments, Congress added
new sections 10 and 11 (47 U.S.C. §§ 160 & 161), regarding
regulatory forbearance and regulatory reform, respectively.
Section 10 permits the Commission, either by its own initia-
tive or upon request, to waive any provisions of the Commu-
nications Act that would otherwise apply to a telecommunica-
tions carrier if the Commission determines that application
of such provisions is neither necessary to protect consumers
nor ensure that rates are just, reasonable, and non-discrimi-
natory, and that it is otherwise in the public interest to do so.
See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Section 11
directs the Commission to biennially review all of its regula-
tions applicable to providers of telecommunications services,
and to repeal or modify any regulations that it finds to no
longer be in the public interest. That both of these sections
are limited to providers of telecommunications service and
make no mention of cable service or cable providers clearly
indicates that Congress believed that convergence between
the cable and telecommunications sectors would likely lead
to most, if not all, facilities based providers being engaged to
some degree in telecommunications service. See A LEGISLA-
TivE HIS-TORY, supra note 7, at 55-58 (regarding universal in-
terconnection) and 316-20 (regarding "convergence" be-
tween cable and telephony).
25 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (providing that a telecommu-
nications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier to the
extent that it provides telecommunications service).
26 See In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Ad-
vanced Telecommunications Capability, Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd.
24012, 24013, para. 11 (Aug. 7, 1998) [hereinafter Advanced
Services Order] (noting, "Congress made clear that the 1996
Act is technologically neutral and designed to ensure compe-
tition in all telecommunications markets").
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tions service. 2 7 It also lifted the ban on the provi-
sion of cable service by companies that also
provide local telecommunications service in the
same geographic area.28 By removing these barri-
ers to competition, Congress intended for the two
types of providers to enter each other's lines of
business and compete directly. 29 As a result nu-
merous changes had to be made to "level the play-
ing field"30 between the disparate regulatory re-
gimes applicable to the different industry
segments.
At issue in the present "open access" debate is
whether Congress intended to apply different
rules to the cable and telecommunications facili-
ties that were now expected to compete directly
with each other to transmit information services
to consumers. The Commission itself recently
stated that "there are two types of communica-
tions service networks .... broadcast ... and...
switched . . . The first type of network best de-
scribes cable service; the second type most accu-
rately depicts telecommunications and informa-
tion services." 31 Given Congressional intent that
the two main wires into the home compete on a
"level playing field" with each other, and the
Commission's apparent understanding that infor-
mation services are provided over telecommunica-
tions networks, it seems incongruous that the
Commission refuses to apply the same open ac-
27 See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
28 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 302(b) (1), Pub.
L. No. 104-104, 10 Stat. 124 (repealing the cable-telephone
cross ownership ban in section 613(b) of the Communica-
tions Act); 47 U.S.C. § 533(b).
29 See S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 148 (stating that
meaningful facilities-based competition to incumbent local
exchange carriers is possible given that cable services are
available to 95 percent of United States homes). See also 47
U.S.C. § 572 (1994 & Supp. IIl 1997) (providing that cable
operators and local exchange carriers are prohibited from
buying each other's facilities in areas where their services
compete or overlap); 47 U.S.C. § 543(1)(1)(D) (adding pro-
vision of video programming by a local exchange carrier as
one of the tests for effective competition that will remove
rate regulation from a cable company).
30 See 142 CONG. REc. S691-01 (Feb. 1, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Stevens) ("... now we have tried to find a way to
literally level the playing field and set down the rules for
competition."). See also id. at S710 (statement of Sen. Kerrey)
("these fundamental features . . . are designed to create a
level playing field"); 142 CONG. REc. H1145-06, 1177 (state-
ment of Rep. Castle) ("the legislation has sought to ensure
that different industries are competing on a level playing
field").
31 See FCC Amicus Brief supra note 2, at 26.
32 The structure of the Communications Act fully sup-
ports this result. Congress added the definition of "informa-
cess requirements that apply to all other telecom-
munications facilities to cable facilities when
those cable facilities are used to transport internet
access and other information services to the pub-
lic.3 2
The Commission and some FCC staff have sug-
gested that perhaps the Commission could de-
velop a new regulatory regime for internet access
provided over cable facilities as an "advanced tele-
communications capability" under the aegis of
section 706 of the 1996 Act.33 Section 706 defines
"advanced telecommunications capability" as a
"high-speed, switched, broadband telecommuni-
cations capability that enables users to originate
and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and
video telecommunications using any technol-
ogy. ' ' 3 4
This definition would certainly appear to in-
clude internet access and other information serv-
ices delivered over a cable facility. However, this
proposed solution once again ignores the statu-
tory reality of what Congress did in the 1996 Act.
As the Commission properly observed in the Ad-
vanced Services Order, section 706 does not confer
any independent regulatory authority on the
Commission. Instead, "the better interpretation of
section 706 is that it directs [the Commission] to
use, among other authority, our forbearance au-
thority under section 10(a) [of the Communica-
tion services" as part of the complete overhaul it made to the
Communications Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20). See also A LEc-
iSLAIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 31 ("The [1996 Act]
brought the most substantial changes in the regulation of
telecommunications services since adoption of the Commu-
nications Act in 1934."). All of the amendments made by the
1996 Act that include the term "information service" were
placed in Title II of the Communications Act. See, e.g., 47
U.S.C. §§ 228, 230, 251, 254, 256, 257, 259, 271, 272 & 274.
None of the amendments made by Congress to Title VI in
the 1996 Act used the term "information service." Instead,
the major thrust of the changes Congress made to Title VI of
the Communications Act in the 1996 Act were devoted to
maintaining the demarcation line between "cable services"
and non-cable services (i.e., telecommunications and infor-
mation services). See 47 U.S.C. §§ 571-573 (1994 & Supp. III
1997). Finally, in Title V of the 1996 Act, Congress made nu-
merous changes to the existing law to address concerns
about obscenity and violence on the internet and on televi-
sion. See Public Law 104-104, Title V, 110 Stat. 133-43. All of
the provisions addressing the internet or computer services
were included in Title I1 of the Communications Act, while
no mention of either computers or the internet was included
in the provisions dealing with video programming and cable
services. See generally S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 187-97.
33 See FCC Amicus Brief supra note 2, at 25; See also Esbin,
supra note 13, at 117.
14 47 U.S.C. § 157 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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tions Act] to encourage the deployment of ad-
vanced services."'3 5 Section 10 of the Act permits
the Commission to forbear from applying any pro-
vision of the Communications Act to a telecom-
munications carrier or telecommunications ser-
vice (but not a cable service) if application of such
provision is not necessary to protect consumers,
ensure rates are just and reasonable, or protect
the public interest 6 Further, Congress provided
in section 3(b) of the 1996 Act that the terms
used in 1996 Act have the same meaning as those
terms have in section 3 of the Communications
Act (as amended by the 1996 Act), so there is no
question that the term "telecommunications" has
the same meaning in both section 706 and the
Communications Act.37 Thus it is clear that Con-
gress believed that "advanced" services would be
offered to the consumer over telecommunications
facilities, which in general are subject to the open
access obligations of Title II.
D. Instead of Promoting Competition, the
Commission's Present Policy May Allow an
Oligopoly to Use Control of Last Mile
Facilities to Dominate the Internet
Carried to its logical conclusion, the Commis-
sion's present policies may result in the establish-
ment of a communications oligarchy dominated
by a few national integrated service providers.
Each of these providers will seek to use its control
of local exchange facilities-either the existing lo-
cal exchange networks or cable facilities-to offer
consumers an exclusive package of internet ac-
cess, other information services, wireless services,
video services and voice services. 38 In each case,
the local connection will be used to control the
customer's choice of providers for other serv-
ices.-3 9 Internal cross-subsidization from a bundled
package of services will make it difficult for small
35 Advanced Services Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 24047, para. 77.
36 See 47 U.S.C. § 160 (1994 & Supp. I1 1997).
37 See Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 3(b) (110 Stat. 61).
38 See Sixth Cable Report, supra note 1, at 34, para. 68. Ana-
lysts believe that bundling of multiple services, offered either
entirely over an operator's own network ... reduces churn
and increases equity values." Id.; see also Lemley-Lessig Lx Parte,
supra note 10, at 20-21.
'9 See Lemley-Lessig Ex Parte, supra note 10, at 20-21.
40 See Cable Operators Finding Success in Local Phone Service,
COMM. DAILY, June 17, 1999, at 4 (noting that "Cablevision
VP Kevin Curran said his company bundles its telephony of-
fering with cable, giving discounts on cable bill in relation to
how much consumer spends on telephone. About six percent
or single service providers to compete. 40 As a re-
sult, competition will be diminished, and, in a bi-
zarre reversal of fortunes, residential subscribers
will be used by the few large, integrated services
providers to subsidize competition among them-
selves for business customers. A review of the ar-
guments demonstrates that the law clearly com-
pels that a cable facility used to provide internet
access to the public for a fee is subject to the same
requirements that apply to every other competi-
tive telecommunications carrier.41 Given that
these same rules do not seem to be hampering
the ability of other competitive local exchange
carriers ("CLECs"), which are common carriers, it
appears that the Commission's fears of over-regu-
lation and a delay or stifling of cable broadband
investment are both unfounded and dangerously
misplaced.
II. CONGRESS ADOPTED THE COMPUTER H
MODEL IN WHICH UNREGULATED
INFORMATION SERVICES "CONTENT"
MUST BE CARRIED TO THE PUBLIC ON
A REGULATED TELECOMMUNICATIONS
"CONDUIT."
A. The Statutory Definitions Show That
Congress Intended That All Information
Services Would Be Provided Using
Telecommunications Facilities
The 1996 Act added numerous new provisions,
including the definitions of "information service"
and "telecommunications." An "information ser-
vice" is defined as "the offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making avail-
able information via telecommunications ,42
"Telecommunications" is defined as "the trans-
mission, between or among points specified by
of customers wind up with free cable as result.").
41 These include the Computer H requirement that a facil-
ities based common carrier that seeks to offer information
services must make the underlying transmission conduit
available to all other information service providers on the
same price, terms and conditions that it makes that transmis-
sion available to itself or its affiliates. See Computer II, 77
F.C.C.2d at 474, para. 231; see also Esbin, supra note 7, at 67
("[T]he [Commission's] order did not distinguish dominant
from non-dominant carriers for purposes of the unbundling
requirement [for packet-switched frame relay transmission
services]."




the user, of information of the user's choosing,
without change in the form or content of the in-
formation as sent and received." 43
Incorporating the defined term "telecommuni-
cations" in the definition of "information service"
clearly indicates, as the Commission itself recently
noted in its amicus brief in the Portland case, that
"information service is distinct from, but uses,
telecommunications. '" 44 The plain meaning of the
definition of "telecommunications" provided by
Congress is that the transmission is at the direc-
tion of the user, and the information concerned is
under the control of the user.45 As a result, the
definition leaves little room for doubt that, for
purposes of the Communications Act, a service is
only an "information service" if it provides the
listed capabilities for use with information chosen
or supplied, and transmitted to or from any point
on the network as directed by the user.
B. The Commission Has Reported to Congress
That Internet Access is an Information
Service That Uses Telecommunications
In April 1998, the Commission sent a report to
43 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
44 FCC Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 4. The Commission
also stated that it has "long distinguished between basic 'tele-
communications' or 'transmission' services, on the one hand,
and 'enhanced services' or 'information services' ... that are
provided by means of telecommunications facilities, on the
other hand. Congress in 1996 codified the FCC's long-stand-
ing distinction by adding new definitions to the Communica-
tions Act." Id. at 3.
45 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (the term "telecommunica-
tions" means "the transmission, between or among points
specified by the use, of information of the user's choosing...
(emphasis added).
46 See generally In re Federal-State Joint Board on Univer-
sal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501 (1998)
[hereinafter Report to Congress]. None of the Commission's
subsequent orders to date have overturned these findings,
and in fact the Commision frequently cites the Report to
Congress in its orders. See, e.g., Advanced Services Order, 13
FCC Rcd. 24012; In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offer-
ing Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Order on Re-
mand, FCC 99413 (Dec. 23, 1999) [hereinafter Advanced Serv-
ices Order on Remand]; Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501.
47 Internet access is not defined in the Communications
Act. In the Report to Congress, the Commission defined in-
ternet access as a combination of "computer processing, in-
formation storage, protocol conversion, and routing with
transmission to enable users to access Internet content and
services." Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. at 11531, para. 63.
48 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (1994 & Supp. III
1997).
49 In Computer II the Commission classified all services
offered over a telecommunications network as either ha-
Congress on the key definitions adopted in the
1996 Act.46 The report, conducted pursuant to a
Congressional mandate, reviewed all of the Com-
mission's rulemakings up to April 1998 with re-
spect to internet access 47 and information serv-
ices. 48 In the Report to Congress, the Commission
reaffirmed several notions including: (1) its un-
derstanding that Congress adopted the Computer
1149 framework in the 1996 Act; (2) Computer II
continued to apply with respect to information
services and internet access, and (3) all "en-
hanced services" 50  are "information services"
under the 1996 Act.5' In addition, the Commis-
sion determined that internet access is a type of
information service 52 and said that when a pro-
vider offers an information service it "uses tele-
communications to do so. ' '5 -" Finally, the Report to
Congress stated emphatically that sections 251 and
254 of the Communications Act should "apply re-
gardless of the underlying technology those ser-
vice providers employ, and regardless of the appli-
cations that ride on top of their services. '" 54
Further, the Commission has said that, to pro-
mote equity and efficiency, it "should avoid creat-
ing regulatory distinctions based purely on tech-
sic or enhanced. A basic service consisted of the offering,
on a common carrier basis, of pure 'transmission capac-
ity for the movement of information.' The .Commission
noted that it was increasingly inappropriate to speak of
carriers offering discrete 'services' such as voice tele-
phone service. Rather, carriers offered communications
paths that subscribers could use as they chose.
An enhanced service, by contrast, was defined as 'any of-
fering over a telecommunications network which is
more than a basic transmission service.'
The Commission therefore determined that enhanced
services, which are offered 'over common carrier trans-
mission facilities,' were themselves not to be regulated
under Title II of the Act no matter how extensive their
communications components.
Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. at 11512, paras. 24-28 (em-
phasis in original, citations omitted).
5) The Commission's regulations define "enhanced ser-
vice" as "services, offered over common carrier transmission
facilities used in interstate communications, which employ
computer processing applications[.]" 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a)
(1998). These regulations were not changed by the passage
of the 1996 Act.
51 See Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. at 11507, 11516-17,
11524, paras. 13, 33, 45.
52 See id. at 11536, para.73.
53 ld. at 11520, para. 39.
54 Id. at 11552, para. 105. Section 251 of the Act requires,
among other things, interconnection among all telecommu-
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nology"5 5 and that "this functional approach is
consistent with Congress' direction that the classi-
fication of a provider should not depend on the
type of facilities used. A telecommunications ser-
vice is a telecommunications service regardless of
whether it is provided using wireline, wireless,
cable, satellite, or some other infrastructure. '"
5 6
The issue of open access and control of facili-
ties was at the heart of the debate in the Computer
!!decision 16 years prior to the enactment of the
1996 Act. In 1980, the Commission stated that the
"essential thrust" of the Computer II proceeding
was to "provide a mechanism whereby non-dis-
criminatory access can be had to basic transmis-
sion services by all enhanced service providers. Be-
cause enhanced services are dependent upon the
common carrier offering of basic services, a basic
service is the building block upon which en-
hanced services are offered."5 7 In reaching its de-
cision, the Commission also found that the
"[i] mportance of control of local facilities, as well
as their location and number, cannot be over-
state[d]. As we evolve into more of an informa-
tion society, the access/bottleneck nature of the
telephone local loop will take on greater signifi-
cance." 58 That access to local facilities is as critical
today as it was then-as is evidenced by the ex-
pensive steps some companies have taken to ob-
tain local access, for example, AT&T's purchase of
TCI and now Media One, and the AOL merger
with Time Warner.5 9 Yet it appears that the pres-
ent Commission has decided to choose the oppo-
site solution from the open access approach that
it picked in 1980.
With respect to internet access providers, the
Commission in the Report to Congress seemly
took no notice of the fact that, with the passage of
the 1996 Act amendments to promote local com-
nications carriers. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(a) (1994 & Supp. Ill
1997). Section 254 requires that all telecommunications car-
riers contribute to universal service. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(d)
(1994 & Supp. 111 1997).
55 Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. at 11548, para. 98.
56 Id. at 11530, para. 59 (emphasis added).
57 Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d. at 475, para. 231.
58 1(. at 468, para. 219.
59 See In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of
Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from
TCI to AT&T Corp., Application, Description of Transaction,
Public Interest Showing and Related Demonstrations, CS Dkt. No.
98-178, at 20 n.36 (Sept. 14, 1998). See also Cable Carried Incen-
tiveforAOL Merger, WASH. PosT, jan. 18, 2000, at El.
60 Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. at 11540, para. 81.
61 See A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 35-37
petition for both telecommunications and cable
service, the rules had changed. The Commission
stated, "Internet access providers typically own no
transmission facilities . . . they lease lines and
otherwise acquire telecommunications from tele-
communications providers-interexchange carri-
ers, incumbent local exchange carriers, competi-
tive local exchange carriers, and others." 6 The
Commission's statement reflects the world as it
was until recently, when local exchange service-
the "last mile" access to the consumer-was gen-
erally provided through a single company that was
the de facto monopoly provider of the transmis-
sion service. 6 1 However, these companies were re-
quired to share the underlying transmission ser-
vice with all internet access and other information
service providers.6"2 The 1996 Act broke open that
de facto monopoly, 63 making it possible for in-
ternet access providers, for example AT&T
through its affiliated entity @Home, to own both
the ISP and the last mile facility needed to offer
internet access and other information services di-
rectly to consumers. Even after the acquisition of
TCI by AT&T, and the further proposed acquisi-
tion of Media One and the AOL-Time Warner
merger, the Commission has yet to indicate that it
understands that its core assumption-that ISPs
generally do not own facilities-is no longer valid
with respect to some national players.64
The Commission did indicate in the Report to
Congress that there may be some information ser-
vice providers that own the facilities that they use
to provide transmission services to themselves. 65
While declining, to consider those information
service providers as common carriers for purposes
of universal service contributions, the Commis-
sion noted that "[i] t is the facilities owners that, in
a real sense, provide the crucial telecommunica-
("the Bell System was able to refuse connection to any com-
munications system beyond its effective control"). See also
Lemley-Lessig Ex Parte, supra note 10, at para. 25.
032 See Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d. at 475, para. 231.
63 See 47 U.S.C. § 253 (removing barriers of entry for in-
terstate and intrastate telecommunications service by any
provider). See also A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at
54-55.
64 See Advanced Services Order on Remand, supra note 46, at
para. 38 (recognizing that their analysis of "exchange access"
does not cover traffic where the ISP itself provides the trans-
port component of its internet service, but noting that such
circumstances are "rare").




tions inputs underlying internet service[.] ' 66
It is the Commission's refusal to recognize that
the world has changed that is creating the central
problem discussed in this article. In light of these
statements regarding technological neutrality and
the detailed analysis of the definitions provided to
Congress, it is difficult to understand how the
Commission can be so confused by the statute
that it is uncertain whether Congress intended
that the same regulatory regime should apply-
"regardless of the facilities used"67-to all trans-
mission facilities used to provide internet access
to the consumer.6 We turn now to a detailed ex-
amination of the statutory language.
III. GIVEN THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENT THAT INFORMATION
SERVICES ARE PROVIDED "VIA
TELECOMMUNICATIONS," CABLE
FACILITIES USED TO PROVIDE
INTERNET ACCESS MUST BE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES.
A. The Cable Industry Claims That Internet
Access is a "Cable Service"
The cable industry currently refuses to provide
unaffiliated ISPs with common carrier access to
the underlying transmission capability that the
cable operators and their affiliates use to transmit
internet access and other information services to
consumers who are cable accessible. Cable facility
owners like AT&T base their refusal on the
grounds that internet access and other informa-
tion services, when provided by a cable operator,
are "cable services." 69 As a result, AT&T claims
that it
merely uses broadband cable facilities to provide infor-
mation services or other advanced cable services to
cable subscribers... Accordingly, none of the common
carrier obligations of Title II can be applied to any
[AT&T owned] TCI cable system either today or during
the period after the [AT&T and TCI] merger when
66 Id. at 11535-36, para. 72. The Commission did ob-
serve that they "have not yet established the regulatory classi-
fication of Internet services provided over cable television fa-
cilities." Id. at 11535 n.140.
67 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (1994 & Supp. II 1997).
68 See FCC Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 19; see also Esbin,
supra note 7, at 98.
69 See In re Petition of Internet Ventures, Inc. and In-
ternet On-Ramp, Inc., Reply Comments of AT&T Corp., Dkt.
No. CSR-5407-L, at 6 (Aug. 11, 1999) [hereinafter AT&T Rem-
ply Comments].
70 In rejoint Application of AT&T Corp. and Tele-Com-
these systems will continue providing only "cable serv-
ices." 7
0
The advantage of AT&T's approach to the cable
operator is obvious. Section 621 (c) of the Com-
munications Act specifically states that a cable op-
erator may not be subjected to the common car-
rier requirements of Title II of the Act "by reason
of providing a cable service."' 7' As a result, under
the AT&T approach, a cable operator can use its
cable facilities to provide internet access and
other information services in direct competition
with the telephone companies, but without having
to provide open access to the underlying transmis-
sion facility as its competitors are required to do.
B. Internet Access is Not a "Cable Service" as
Defined by the Communications Act.
AT&T and the cable industry are incorrect as a
matter of law that internet access and other infor-
mation services meet the definition of "cable ser-
vice" as set forth in section 602(6) of the Commu-
nications Act.72 The statutory definition of "cable
service" in the Communications Act has remained
substantially unchanged since Congress first
adopted it in 1984. 7-1 In particular, subparagraph
(A) of the definition, which contains the two
mandatory criteria for determining when a service
qualifies as a cable service, has never been
amended. Congress did make a minor change in
1996 to subparagraph (B) of the definition, but
the statutory construction of the definition makes
it clear that the additional criteria in subpara-
graph (B) are discretionary. They become rele-
vant to the definition only if a service first meets
the two required criteria in subparagraph (A). If
the service does not meet both of those criteria,
then nothing in the language of subparagraph
(B), even as amended, can make an otherwise in-
eligible service qualify as a cable service.
As amended, Section 602(6) of the Communi-
munications, Inc., AT&T's and TCI's Joint Reply to Comments
and Joint Opposition to Petitions to Deny or to Impose Conditions,
CS Dkt. No. 98-178, at 53 (Nov. 13, 1998) [hereinafter
AT&T/TCIJoint Reply]. See also AT&T Reply Comments, supra
note 69, at 6 n.19 (noting, "Federal law prohibits regulating
cable systems providing cable services as a common carrier").
71 47 U.S.C. § 541 (c) (1994 & Supp. IIl 1997).
72 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (1994 & Supp. I1 1997).
73 See Cable Communication Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2779, 2781 (1984) (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 522(6)) [hereinafter Cable Act of 1984].
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cations Act defines "cable service" as "(A) the one-
way transmission to subscribers of (i) video pro-
gramming, or (ii) other programming service,
and (B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is re-
quired for the selection or use of such video pro-
gramming or other programming service." 74 This
definition tracks the fundamental distinction re-
lied on by the courts and the Commission prior to
1984 to treat cable television systems as non-com-
mon carrier facilities, namely that they were being
used to retransmit television programming nor-
mally regulated under Title III. 7 5 From the plain
language of the definition, it is clear that the two
conditions set forth in subparagraph (A) must al-
ways be met for a service to be classified as a
"cable service." First, the service must provide "a
one-way transmission to the subscriber." Second,
that transmission must consist of either "video
programming" or an "other programming ser-
vice."
Therefore, for internet access or any other in-
formation service to be provided as a "cable ser-
vice," the information at issue would have to be
provided via a "one-way transmission to the sub-
scriber," and the information the service provided
would have to meet the definition of either "video
programming" or an "other programming ser-
vice."176 Under the specific criteria set forth by
Congress to define an "information service" it is
apparent that neither of these two required condi-
74 47 U.S.C. § 522 (6)(B) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997).
75 "The Committee intends to exempt video program-
ming from common carrier regulation in accordance with
the traditional conception that the one-way delivery of televi-
sion programs, movies, sporting events and the like is not a
common carrier activity." H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 53 (1984)
[hereinafter referred to in text as House Cable Act Report]. In
fact, the legal underpinning of the exemption of "cable ser-
vice" from common carrier obligations is the editorial con-
trol exercised by the cable operator over the information
sent to the subscriber. See U.S. v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157 (1968). If the cable industry is correct, which it
is not, then the industry is essentially claiming that the cable
facility operator exercises editorial control over all informa-
tion received by subscribers who obtain internet access over a
cable facility. Given that the very value of the internet is that
it provides nearly unlimited access to content without any ed-
itorial control by any single entity, a less plausible contention
is difficult to imagine.
76 The Commission agrees: As it stated to the Court in its
Amicus brief, "[a] service cannot be a 'cable service' unless it
qualifies as 'video programming' or 'other programming ser-
vice.' The 1996 Telecommunications Act did not alter the
definitions of 'video programming' or 'other programming
service.' Unless [i] nternet access fits one of these definitions,
it cannot qualify as 'cable service.' " FCC Amicus Brief supra
tions in the definition of "cable service" can be
met.
The definitions of "video programming" and
"other programming service" have also remained
unchanged since Congress first included them in
the Communications Act in 1984. Section 602 (20)
defines "video programming" as "programming
provided by, or generally considered comparable
to programming provided by, a television broad-
cast station."77 Section 602(14) defines "other
programming service" as "information that a
cable operator makes available to all subscribers
generally."78
It is fairly plain that "video programming,"
which is programming provided by, or compara-
ble to, that provided by a television station (i.e., a
station licensed for one-way, over-the-air broad-
casting of signals to any subscriber equipped with
a television set to receive those signals) does not
qualify under the statutory definition of "informa-
tion services." Under no circumstance can a televi-
sion station, much less programming provided by
a television station, be said to be engaged in the
"offering of a capability for generating, acquiring,
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving,
utilizing, or making available information via tele-
communications .. . ;"79 i.e., a transmission of in-
formation that is chosen by and transmitted
under the direction of a user. 0 With "video pro-
gramming" eliminated as a possible option, in-
note 2, at 23.
77 47 U.S.C. § 522(20) (1994 & Supp. Ill 1997).
78 47 U.S.C. § 522(14) (1994 & Supp. I1 1997).
79 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (1994 & Supp. 1I1 1997).
80 AT&T, the National Cable Television Association, and
Time Warner Cable all seem to be in complete agreement on
this point, arguing in their comments and reply comments in
the [VI Petition that internet access clearly does not meet the
definition of "video programming." See In re Petition of In-
ternet Ventures, Inc., Reply Comments of Time Warner, Inc.,
Dkt. No CSR-5407-L, at 4. (emphasizing that "no serious
claim is, or can be, made by M or any other ISP that the
internet, as a two-way, interactive service, is in any fashion
comparable, from the consumer's perspective, to the one-way
video programming generally offered by broadcast stations in
1984"); see also In re Petition of Internet Ventures, Inc. and
Internet On-Ramp, Inc., Comments of AT&T Corp., Dkt. No.
CSR-5407-L, at 9 (stating "[t] his is not video programming at
all, but rather access to content"); see also In re Petition of
Internet Ventures, Inc., Reply Comments of the National Cable
Television Association, Dkt. No. CSR-5407-L, at 6-7 (Aug. 11,
1999) (explaining that "[t]he [i]nternet as a whole is hardly
comparable to the programming provided by a television
broadcast station"); see AT&T Reply Comments, supra note 69,
at 5 (stating that "ISPs provide connectivity, not content").
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ternet access, and apparently any other informa-
tion service accessible through a cable facility,
must be an "other programming service" if it is to
be considered a "cable service" subject to exclu-
sion from common carrier obligations under sec-
tion 621(c) of the Communications Act.8 '
In 1984, the similarity between the editorial
control over content exerted by a broadcaster,
and that exerted by a cable operator, was the
nexus Congress chose for determining which serv-
ices would be exempt from the common carrier
requirements of the Communications Act. As a re-
sult, Congress maintained the linkage to broad-
casting services in the other statutory component
of the definition of "cable service." An "other pro-
gramming service" is defined as "information that
a cable operator makes available to all subscribers
generally."8 2 Further, Congress explained in the
legislative history that the definition was intended
to include services that are ancillary to broadcast-
ing.83
AT&T claims that because it makes internet ac-
cess "available" to all subscribers, its service meets
the definition of an "other programming ser-
vice."84 For AT&T's argument to be even facially
plausible, one would have to believe that the term
"information" has the same meaning as the term
"information service" for purposes of the Commu-
nications Act. Clearly it does not.8 5
Both the statutory language used by Congress
and the explicit legislative history demonstrate
that "information services" are not included in
the definition of "other programming service."86
Looking at the plain meaning of the words used,
an "information service" is "the offering of a capa-
bility for generating, acquiring, storing, trans-
81 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (1994 & Supp. 1II 1997). Section
621 (c) provides that "[a]ny cable system shall not be subject
to regulation as a common carrier or utility by reason of pro-
viding any cable service." Id.
82 47 U.S.C. § 602(14) (1994 & Supp. 1I1 1997).
83 See H.R. REp. No. 98-934, at 41 (stating that "[o]ther
programming services that make non-video information gen-
erally available to all subscribers are included as cable serv-
ices because they are sufficiently like video programming to
warrant a similar regulatory exemption.") This approach
makes sense and tracks court decisions regarding the Com-
mission's jurisdiction over cable services. See also Southwestern
Cable, 392 U.S. at 177 (1968) (commenting that the Commis-
sion's authority over cable services is restricted to that reason-
ably ancillary to its effective performance of its responsibili-
ties for regulation of television).
84 See AT&T Reply Comments, supra note 69, at 6.
forming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or mak-
ing available information via telecommunications
.. 87 A cable operator that makes available to all
subscribers information selected by the cable op-
erator cannot be said to be offering each sub-
scriber the "capability for" individually manipulat-
ing that information.88 The statutory criteria
describe two completely different services. They
are not interchangeable.
Information selected by the cable operator is
provided to all users under the statutory defini-
tion of "other programming service."8'' The sub-
scriber or user is a passive participant, in much
the same manner that a television broadcast
viewer is. In contrast, the subscriber or user of an
"information service" is clearly an active partici-
pant under the terms of the statutory definition.9°1
Information selected, created, or changed by a
user, or which the user is "making available" to
others, cannot be said to be "information that a
cable operator makes available" and therefore
cannot be an "other programming service" as de-
fined by the Communications Act.9'
Even if the plain language of the statute leaves
any room for doubt, the legislative history of the
Cable Act does not.92 In the 1984 Cable Act Con-
gress adopted the House definition of "other pro-
gramming service,"93 and the House Cable Act Re-
port states that the "definition of other
programming services requires that the informa-
tion provided in a cable service must be made
available to all subscribers generally and may not
include information that is subscriber-specific...
services providing subscribers with the capacity to
engage in transactions or to store, transform, for-
ward, manipulate, or otherwise process informa-
85 The term "information" is not defined under the
Communications Act. It should be noted that in the 1996 Act
Congress chose not to amend the definition of "other pro-
gramming service" to include the newly defined term "infor-
mation service," despite adding that definition and making
changes to other definitions in Title VI of the Cornmunica-
tions Act.
86 See 47 U.S.C. § 552 (14) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
87 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
88 See id.
89 47 U.S.C. § 522(14).
9o See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).
91 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(20) & 522(14).
92 The Commission quoted extensively from this detailed
and clearly stated legislative history in its amicus brief in the
Portland case. See FCC Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 21.
93 See Cable Act of 1984, § 2, 98 Stat. 2779, 2781.
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tion or data would not be cable services." 94
It was no accident that the House Cable Act Report
tracks so closely the terms the Commission and
the courts defined as "enhanced" or "informa-
tion" services. The Commission adopted its Com-
puter II "basic/enhanced" dichotomy in 1980,
just four years before the enactment of the Cable
Act. Two years before the Cable Act, the Modifica-
tion of Final Judgment in the antitrust case
against AT&T defined "information services" as
"the offering of a capability for ... storing, trans-
forming, processing, retrieving, utilizing... infor-
mation by means of telecommunications . . .95
Thus, the very activities that are at the heart of
information services and internet access were
clearly intended by Congress in 1984 to be ex-
cluded from the definition of "cable service." In
fact, the House Cable Act Report could not make the
point more clearly when it states "[s]ome exam-
ples of non-cable services would be: shop-at-home
and bank-at-home services, electronic mail, one-
way and two-way transmission o [f] non-video data
and information not offered to all subscribers,
data processing, video-conferencing, and all voice
communications." 96
Even though the world wide web was still nearly
10 years in the future, Congress in fairly unambig-
uous terms included what are now internet serv-
ices in the list of services excluded from the defini-
tion of "cable service" that was enacted in the
Cable Act.97 However, the cable industry claims
that in 1996 Congress completely reversed itself,
adopting through a two word change a sweeping
evisceration of the limitations it so clearly and de-
liberately adopted in 1984.98 It is on this slender
thread that the cable industry hangs its entire
legal argument.
94 H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 42.
95 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 at 179.
(D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub. nom. Maryland v. United States, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983). A footnote in the opinion referred to the
definition of "information services" in the Modification of Fi-
nal judgement (MFJ) as "essentially ... equivalent" to the
Commission's definition of "enhanced services" in Computer
II. See id. at 178 n.198. In the 1996 Act, Congress adopted a
modified version of the MFJ definition as the statutory defini-
tion of "information services" now found in section 3 of the
Communications Act. See S. CONF. REI. No. 104-230, at
115-16.
96 H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 44.
97 See id.
C. The 1996 Amendment to the Definition of
Cable Service Did Not Expand the
Definition of "Cable Service" to Include
"Information Services."
In the 1996 Act, Congress amended the defini-
tion of "cable service" to include the phrase "or
use" in subparagraph (B).99 As amended, "cable
service" is now defined to mean "(A) the one-way
transmission to subscribers of (i) video program-
ming, or (ii) other programming service, and (B)
subscriber interaction, if any, which is required
for the selection or use of such video program-
ming or other programming service." 10
Other than the addition of "or use," the defini-
tion has not changed. The basic mandatory crite-
ria remain: Cable service is limited to "the one-
way transmission to subscribers of (i) video pro-
gramming or (ii) other programming service."'' 1
Nevertheless, the cable industry argues that the
addition of "or use" was intended by Congress to
overturn the explicit statutory limitations adopted
by Congress in 1984.102 In support of its position
the cable industry and others rely on a single sen-
tence in the 1996 Act Conference Report, as well as a
floor statement made by a single member of the
House of Representatives.'" 3
Unfortunately for the cable industry, the statu-
tory construction of subparagraph (B) makes that
subparagraph an optional add-on to, and not a
part of, the subparagraph (A) definition. Thus,
subscriber interaction, "if any," may be provided
as part of the "cable service," but only if it is "re-
quired for the selection or use of such video pro-
gramming or other programming service.' 1 4 It is
only after a service has met both statutory criteria
in subparagraph (A) that the "or use" amend-
98 See FCC Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 22 (noting that
"AT&T and TCI have argued that Congress, by adding the
words 'or use,' intended to expend the definition of 'cable
service' to include the wide range of interactive services en-
compassed by Internet access").
99 See 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (B) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
1 1 Id. at § 522(6) (emphasis added).
]01 Id.
102 See FCC Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 22.
'" See Esbin, supra note 7, at 96 (citing S. REP. No. 104-
230 at 169 (1996) and 142 CONG. REC. H1156 (daily ed. Feb.
1, 1996) (statement by Rep. Dingell)).




ment applies, and only to the extent that the
cable operator chooses to permit such selection
or use.
The House Cable Act Report stated that "a cable
service may not provide subscribers with the ca-
pacity to communicate instructions or commands
to software packages such as computer or video
games . . ." Arguably, the addition of "or use"
could imply some limited two-way interaction by
the subscriber, for example to send commands to
a video game stored and operated at the com-
puter headend. This would expand the 1984 Act
definition slightly to allow interactive gaming
among multiple cable subscribers without the ex-
ception "swallowing the rule," as the cable indus-
try would have the Commission believe. 116
Whatever intentions AT&T and the cable industry
might suggest, the statutory construction of the
definition as amended makes the amendment in-
significant to the determination of whether or not
an "information service" can also be a "cable ser-
vice." Notwithstanding the confusing reference to
"information services made available to subscrib-
ers by a cable operator" in the 1996 Act Conference
Report, 10 7 "an apparent congressional intent as re-
vealed in a conference report does not trump a
pellucid statutory directive."108
IV. DESPITE THE COMMISSION'S
CONFUSION, THE CONGRESS DID NOT
LEAVE THE REGULATORY
CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION
SERVICES PROVIDED OVER CABLE
FACILITIES UNRESOLVED.
105 See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 42.
106 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 374 ("The
[amendment] expanded an exception to the definition's gen-
eral requirement that 'cable service' be 'one-way.' Without
some limit on the interactivity permitted, the exception
would swallow the rule.") (emphasis in original).
107 See S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 169.
108 See City of Dallas, Texas v. FCC, 165 F. 3d 341, 349
(5th Cir. 1999). See atso FCC Amicus Brief supra note 2, at 24
(observing that "Congress stated that its 1996 amendment of
the definition of cable service was not intended to eliminate
the longstanding regulatory distinction between telecommu-
nications service and cable service" (citing S. CONF. REP. No.
104-230, at 169)).
109 H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 41.
110 Id. at 60.
11 1 Id. The Cable Act of 1984 also specifically states, "The
provisions in this Act and the amendments made by this Act
A. Congress Intended the Definition of Cable
Service to Clearly Mark the Boundary
Between Services
The legislative history of the Cable Act also
demonstrates that Congress carefully limited the
definition of "cable service" in order to "mark the
boundary between those services provided over a
cable system which would be exempted from com-
mon carrier regulation under section 621 (c) and
all other communications services that could be
provided over a cable system."' °9
Congress recognized that "non-cable communi-
cations services [provided over cable systems] are
subject to regulatory authority"' I10 and that "state
and Federal authority over non-cable communica-
tions services [offered over cable systems] under
the status quo shall be unaffected by the provi-
sions of Title VI." 111 The House Cable Act Report
also states that "nothing in Title VI shall be con-
strued to affect authority to regulate any cable op-
erator to the extent that such operator provides
any communications service other than cable service,
whether offered on a common carrier or private
contract basis." 12
Finally, the report goes on to state, for example,
that "[m] aking available a cable system for voice
communication between subscribers would not be
a cable service ... Similarly, offering cable system
capacity for the transmission of private data ...
would not be a cable service . . .,,113
Given these very specific examples, it is appar-
ent that in 1984 Congress did not intend to per-
mit cable facilities to be used to provide telecom-
shall not be construed to affect any jurisdiction the Federal
Communications Commission may have under the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 with respect to any communication by
wire or radio (other than cable service, as defined by section
602(5) of such Act) which is provided through a cable sys-
tem, or persons or facilities engaged in such communica-
tions." Cable Act of 1984, § 3(b), 98 Stat. 2779, 2801 (1984).
112 H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 63 (emphasis added). Sec-
tion 621 (d) of the Communications Act allows the Commis-
sion or a state to require the filing of informational tariffs for
any intrastate communication service other than a cable ser-
vice. See 47 U.S.C. § 541(d). The legislative history accompa-
nying this section makes clear that Congress intended the in-
formational tariff requirement to provide the Commission
and the states information necessary to determine if a service
should be regulated as a common carrier service. See id.
113 Id. at 42.
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munications services under a different regulatory
regime than the one that applied to common car-
riers." 4 The "level playing" field concept of the
1996 Act continued this longstanding intent.
B. Cable Facility Operators Providing
Information Service to Subscribers Act as
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers to the
Extent They Provide Non-Cable Services
If internet access and information services are
not "cable services," then AT&T and other cable
facility operators act as competitive local ex-
change carriers when they provide broadband in-
ternet access and other information services to
the public over cable facilities. When discussing
internet access provided by incumbent local ex-
change carriers, the Commission stated recently
that an end-user may utilize a telecommunica-
tions service together with an information service,
as in the case of internet access. In such a case,
however, the two services are treated separately:
The first service is a telecommunications service
(e.g., the xDSL-enabled transmission path), and
the second service is an information service-in
this case internet access.' 15 The internet access
provided by a cable operator through @Home is
no different from the internet access provided by
114 See generally Esbin, supra note 7, at 66 ("Of particular
concern with respect to cable's increasing capacity for two-
way transmission services was the effect of telephone sub-
scriber by-pass of the regulated local exchange networks in
favor of the potentially unregulated provision of voice and
data services by the cable companies."). In the 1996 Act, Con-
gress specifically required that all telecommunications carri-
ers must contribute to universal service. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 254(d). This requirement would have little meaning if
cable facilities could be used to escape universal service con-
tributions.
115 See Advanced Services Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 24030,
para. 36 (citation omitted).
116 See In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of
Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from
TCI to AT&T, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd.
3160, 3195, para. 70 (1999) [hereinafter TC1 Order]; see also
FCC Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 12-13.
117 See TC1 Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 9195, para. 70.
118 See Joint Reply of AT&T and TCI, supra note 51, at
53-54. In fact, the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission
recently approved AT&T tariffs for local exchange service of-
fered over TCI's cable network in Pittsburgh and its suburbs.
Pa. PUC Approved AT&T Tariffs for Local Exchange Service,
COMM. DAILY, Dec. 17, 1999, at 10.
1 19 The authors are aware that some commentators have
argued that the new definition of "information service" and
the addition of section 230(b) to the Communications Act
have removed from the Commission any jurisdiction over in-
any other local exchange carrier (incumbent or
competitive) through its own affiliated ISP. The
Commission itself describes cable modem ser-
vice-and in particular the service provided to
AT&T's customers through @Home-in terms of
separate services that are bundled together when
offered to the consumer.' '" One of the services is
"the underlying transport service" or "use of the
cable network for data delivery services," while the
others are described as "internet access" and "con-
tent. ' 1 7 Further, AT&T itself has already admit-
ted that it would be a competitive local exchange
carrier when it provides "telecommunications ser-
vice" over its cable facilities, albeit with the caveat
that it is not yet one because it may provide in-
ternet access and other information services over
its cable system as a "cable service," rather than
"via telecommunications" as all other local ex-
change carriers do.' I' Unfortunately for AT&T's
position, it is the statute-and not the carrier-
that determines who is a local exchange carrier.
Since 1984 Congress has made it clear that a
cable operator can be regulated as a telephone
company when it provides non-cable services. The
new definitions Congress added in the 1996 Act
make it even clearer.' '-' One of the goals of the
1996 Act was to provide competitively neutral re-
quirements for the provision of similar services. 120
ternet access or other information services, even when those
services are provided by a local exchange carrier. See Leonard
Kennedy & Lori Zallaps, If It Ain't Broke... The FCC and In-
ternet Regulation, 7 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 17, 26 (1999). The
authors disagree with the legal analysis of the article, which
relies heavily on a "policy" statement by Congress in section
230 of the Communications Act dealing with indecent con-
tent. The article overlooks completely the legislative history
of section 230. The section as passed by the House contained
an explicit prohibition on FCC regulation of the internet,
but that restriction was deleted in conference. See A LEGISLA-
rvE HmsroRy, supra note 7, at 379 ("the House bill's Cox-
Wyden ... declaration that the FCC was given no new juris-
diction to regulate the Internet was dropped"). In short,
there is nothing in section 230-which in any case is con-
cerned solely with internet content and not transmission-
that supports rejection of the fundamental regulatory struc-
ture of the Communications Act and the plain meaning of
the definitions contained in sections 3 of the Act.
120 See 142 CONG. REC. S710 (1996) (statement of Sen.
Kerry) (commenting that "[t]hese fundamental features of
the conference report on S. 652 [the 1996 Act] are designed
to create a level playing field where every player will be able
to compete on the basis of price, quality, and service"); 142
CONG. REC. H1177 (1996) (statement of Rep. Castle) (stating
that "the legislation has sought to ensure that different indus-
tries will be competing on a level playing field"); 142 CONG.
REC. S691 (1996) (statement of Sen. Stevens) (explaining
that "we have tried to find a way to literally level the playing
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Thus Congress made it clear that a cable facility
operator can also be a telephone company, or
more precisely a "local exchange carrier"''2
under the statutory definitions in the Act. As part
of the proceedings to implement both section 251
of the Act and section 706 of the 1996 Act, the
Commission found that advanced services like
packet-switching and xDSL service are "telecom-
munications" and that when advanced services are
provided by an incumbent local exchange carrier
they are either "telephone exchange service" or
"exchange access."'122 Any person-incumbent or
not-who provides "telephone exchange ser-
vice" 123 or "exchange access"'' 2 4 is a "local ex-
change carrier" for purposes of the Communica-
tions Act. 125 Further, the Commission noted,
"[n]othing in the statutory language or legislative
history limits [the terms "telephone exchange ser-
vice" and "exchange access"] to the provision of
voice, or conventional circuit switched service ...
The plain language of the statute thus refutes any
attempt to tie these statutory definitions to a par-
ticular technology."126
Other than the nature of the facilities used,
there is no significant difference between broad-
band internet access offered over cable facilities
and that offered by local exchange carriers using
DSL transmission. As a matter of law there is no
support in the Communications Act for different
regulatory treatment of these identical services
based solely on the type of facilities used, 12 7 nor
does the Communications Act draw any distinc-
tion between types of local exchange carriers (i.e.,
field . . . I do believe we have succeeded").
121 47 U.S.C. § 153(26) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
122 See In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering
Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Order on Remand,
FCC 99-413, at para. 3 (rel. Dec. 23, 1999) [hereinafter Order
on Remand].
123 "Telephone exchange service" is service "operated to
furnish to subscribers intercommunicating service . . . or
comparable service provided through a system of switches,
transmission equipment, or other facilities (or combination
thereof) by which a subscriber can originate and terminate a
telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. § 153(47) (1994 &
Supp. Il1 1997).
124 1998)
"'[E]xchange access'" means the "offering of access to tel-
ephone exchange services or facilities[.]" 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(16) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
125 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(26) (1994 & Supp. Il 1997).
126 Advanced Seroices Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 24011,
para.41. See also Order on Remand, supra note 122, at para. 21.
127 As the Commission recently noted to the Court in
Portland, "it is not readily apparent why the classification of
the service should vary with the facilities used to provide the
incumbent or competitive) or the facilities used
to provide a transmission service for purposes of
deciding who is a "local exchange carrier"1 28 or a
"telecommunications carrier." 129
C. The Changes Made to Title VI by the 1996
Act Demonstrate that Congress Intended to
Preserve the Distinction Between Cable
Services and Telecommunications Services
If one broadens their review of the changes
made in the 1996 Act beyond the addition of "or
use" that is so often cited by the cable industry, a
clearer pattern emerges. Congress made extensive
changes to Title VI with respect to the heart of the
issue raised in this debate, namely the relation-
ship between cable services, information services,
and telecommunications services.
In particular, Congress took considerable pains
to add several new sections to Title VI. Part V of
Title VI, titled "Video Programming Services Pro-
vided By Telephone Companies," seems to have
escaped the Commission's notice entirely when it
comes to examining the relationship between in-
formation services provided over cable facilities
and those same services provided over more tradi-
tional facilities.' 30 In addition, Congress added
explicit provisions to existing sections of Title VI
to prohibit local franchising authorities from re-
quiring a cable operator to provide a telecommu-
nications service as part of its franchise obliga-
tions. 13
service." FCC Amicus Brief supra note 2, at 25.
128 The Act merely states, " 'Local exchange carrier'
means any person that is engaged in the provision of tele-
phone exchange service or exchange access." 47 U.S.C.
§153(26) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (emphasis added). See also
City of Dallas, Texas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 354 (5th Cir.
1999) (explaining that "Congress also knew how to distin-
guish among respective groups of LECs ... When Congress
wanted to distinguish traditional, incumbent LECs from the
new "competitive" LECs (including cable companies) whose
entry the Act facilitated, it did so in plain terms.").
129 A "telecommunications carrier" is any person who of-
fers telecommunications to the public for a fee, regardless of
the facilities used. See 47 U.S.C. §153(44) & (46) (1994 &
Supp. III 1997).
1 " Part V of Title VI is not discussed at all in any of the
works cited in footnote 13 in which various FCC staff ex-
amined or opined on the issue of internet access and other
information services provided over cable facilities.
I"I See 47 U.S.C. § 541(b). Section 303 of the 1996 Act,
added a new paragraph (3) to section 621 (b) It also
amended section 622(b) to limit franchise fees to "cable ser-
vice" only. See 47 U.S.C.§ 542(b); see also S. CONF. Ru',. No.
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Section 651 (a) of the Act'_3 2 establishes a com-
mon regulatory treatment of video programming
provided by a common carrier for each different
type of transmission media regulated by the Act.
Common carriers and any other person using ra-
dio communication to provide video program-
ming are all to be regulated under Title 1II. "'l
Common carriers only transmitting video pro-
gramming on a common carrier basis are to be
regulated only under Title II. Any other use of
common carrier facilities to provide video pro-
gramming to subscribers must be done either
through a cable system subject to parts I through
IV of Title VI'13 4 or through an open video system
subject to section 653 of the Act.'13 5 In either case
the facilities are subject to regulation under Title
II for all non-cable services and to the appropriate
sections or section of Title VI for cable services.
Section 651 (b) of the Act most clearly illustrates
that Congress had a specific demarcation point
between services in mind. That section states that
"[a] local exchange carrier that provides cable
service through an open video system or a cable
system shall not be required, pursuant to Title II
of this Act, to make capacity available on a nondis-
criminatory basis to any other person for the pro-
vision of cable service directly to subscribers."'"'!
This section demonstrates that Congress was
concerned that, absent this explicit limitation
reinforcing the exemption from common carrier
requirements for "cable service" in section 621 (c),
common carrier requirements might be applied
to permit competing cable service providers to
use the local exchange facilities of a "telephone
company" that also used those common carrier fa-
cilities to provide its own cable service. This would
undo the "level playing field" Congress sought to
create, because cable operators do not have to
104-230, at 180.
1-32 47 U.S.C. § 57 1(a) (1994 & Stipp. 11 1997).
133 This provision was intended to "create parity among
providers of services using radio communications." S. CONF.
REP. No. 104-230, at 172; see also 47 U.S.C. § 336 (Supp. II
1996) (addressing the regulation of the provision of ancillary
and supplementary services by broadcast licensees).
134 47 U.S.C. §§ 521& 561.
135 47 U.S.C. §§ 571 & 573 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
136 47 U.S.C. § 571(b) (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
'7 See S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 172 ("an integrated
cable system utilizing its own telephone exchange facilities");
see also id. at 178 ("In another effort to ensure parity among
video providers, the conferees state that [open video system]
fees may only be assessed on revenues derived from compara-
ble cable services"); id. at 180 (stating that "the franchise fee
share their facilities with competing cable service
providers. As a result, as the legislative history of
section 651 (b) indicates, Congress intended that
a common facility could be used for both cable
services and telecommunications services, and
specific language was included so that the com-
mon facility would be regulated appropriately
under Title II for telecommunications services
and under Title VI for cable services. 13 7
That a cable facility could be used for more
than one type of regulated service was not a new
or novel idea on the part of Congress in 1996. In
the NARUC II case the court stated that "it is at
least logical to conclude that one can be a com-
mon carrier for some activities but not others.""'
During consideration of the 1984 Cable Act the
House Commerce Committee expressed a similar
view, stating "[w]hile cable operators are permit-
ted under the provisions of Title VI to provide any
mixture of cable and non-cable services they
choose, the manner in which a cable service is
marketed would not alter its status as a cable ser-
vice . . . the combined offering of a non-cable
shop-at-home service with service that by itself met
all the conditions for being a cable service would
not transform the shop-at-home service into a
cable service, or transform the cable service into a
non-cable communications service." 139 Twelve
years later the view of Congress had not changed.
Services that are not cable services remain subject
to regulation under other tides of the Act.
The cable industry, and perhaps the Commis-
sion, appears to believe that part V of Title VI only
applies to companies that started life as a tele-
phone company. 14 However, there is nothing in
the Act or the legislative history of the 1996 Act
that supports such a limited view.1 4 1 If internet
access and other information services are in-
provision is not intended to reach revenues that a cable oper-
ator derives for providing new telecommunications services
over its system").
138 National Association of Regulated Utilities Commis-
sioners v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (1976) [hereinafter NARUC
II].
'39, H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 44.
141) As noted earlier, AT&T has in fact been certified as a
local exchange carrier in Pennsylvania for the provision of
local exchange service using its cable facilities. See supra note
112.
141 "[A]s a result of the walls brought down and the
forces unleashed by this bill, it is not clear what will consti-
tute a telephone company in the future-perhaps every firm
that transmits information by any electronic means." 142
CONG. REC. S698 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kerrey).
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cluded under the definition of cable service, as
the cable industry advocates, then any local ex-
change carrier, including an incumbent local ex-
change carrier such as Bell Atlantic, could escape
any obligation to provide open access to ISPs or
unbundled network elements and interconnec-
tion to competitive local exchange carriers who
wish to provide internet access services. 142 This
would be the case because section 651(b) of the
Act states a local exchange carrier is under no Ti-
tle II obligation to make capacity available for the
provision of cable service.143 The explicit limita-
tions Congress so carefully imposed in the defini-
tion of "cable service" would be made meaning-
less, and facilities-based ISPs, including
incumbent local exchange carriers like Bell Atlan-
tic and SBC, would be free to determine their own
regulatory regime. 144 It is clear that Congress did
not intend for this to be possible under the plain
language of the Communications Act.
V. CONCLUSION
The Commission's choice so far to ignore the
explicit requirements of the Communications Act
as they apply to cable facilities used to provide in-
ternet access cannot ultimately be upheld by the
courts. By allowing cable companies to create oli-
gopolies in the high speed internet access market-
place, the Commission dooms to extinction any
number, perhaps even thousands, of smaller ISPs
whose presence is the driving force behind in-
142 These requirements are found, among other places
in Title I1, in new section 251 of the Communications Act, as
added by the 1996 Act. As the Commission found in the Ad-
vanced Services Order, section 251 is one of the "cornerstones
of the framework Congress established in the 1996 Act." Ad-
vanced Services Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 24011, para. 76. Given
the intensity of the debate surrounding the. 1996 Act and im-
portance Congress attached to it, it seems unlikely that Con-
gress would overlook, much less permit, such a possibility.
143 47 U.S.C. § 571(b) (stating that "[a] local exchange
carrier that provides cable service through an open video sys-
tem or a cable system shall not be required, pursuant to sub-
chapter I of this chapter, to make capacity available on a
nondiscriminatory basis to any other person for the provision
of cable service directly to subscribers") (emphasis added).
ternet access competition and technological inno-
vation. Ironically, it is the competitive internet
marketplace that the Commission insists it is seek-
ing to promote when it willfully abdicates its statu-
tory responsibilities and allows increasingly con-
centrated and powerful cable facility operators to
avoid their obligation to make their underlying
telecommunications transmission facilities avail-
able on a common carrier basis.
Destruction of a vital and competitive internet
services market would in itself be disastrous, and it
would represent a perverse outcome for a policy
largely justified by the disingenuous cry of "don't
regulate the internet." If the Commission allows
the cable industry to "interpret" the language of
the Communications Act out of existence in order
to avoid its common carrier responsibilities, how
can the Commission continue to require that an
incumbent or competitive telephone company
providing the same service make its facilities avail-
able to all ISPs on a non-discriminatory basis? The
answer, of course, is that it cannot, with the result
that the entire regime designed by the Commis-
sion and Congress to foster meaningful competi-
tion and consumer choice is gutted, to be re-
paired, if at all, at the cost of years of unnecessary
litigation. Both industry and the consuming pub-
lic would be far better served if the Commission
were to re-examine its policies-this time in the
full light of the statute-and correct its course
before it is too late.
144 The Commission noted this problem as well in its
Amicus brief, stating, "Under [the cable industry's] broad
statutory interpretation, however, 'other programming ser-
vice' would arguably include any transmission capability that
enables subscribers to select and receive information, includ-
ing basic telephone service." FCC Amicus Brief supra note 2, at
24. AT&T's interpretation that "cable service" includes in-
ternet access and other information services could also per-
mit the Regional Bell companies to escape the in-region in-
terLATA restrictions so carefully imposed by Congress in
section 271 of the Act, because the definition of "incidental
interLATA services" in section 271(g)(1) (A) of the Act-
which are not subject to the ban-includes "video program-
ming" and "other programming service" as defined in section
602 of the Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 271 (g) (1)(A) (1997).
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